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Pharmaceutical Overpromotion Liability:
The Legal Battle Over Rural
Prescription Drug Abuse
BY PHILLIP J. WININGER*
INTRODUCTION
P roviding hope to thousands of pain sufferers, Purdue Pharma
introduced OxyContin in 1996, heralding the new drug as a great
advancement in the science of pain medication.' However, in the years
since, the story did not unfold as planned. Instead of achieving wonder-
drug status, OxyContin became tainted by illegal abuse and widespread
addiction.2 Today, antagonism overshadows fanfare for the drug as its
opponents wage an intense legal battle against the manufacturer. Purdue
Pharma currently faces over 290 lawsuits, including seven Kentucky
suits.' One of the most noteworthy of these cases was filed in Ohio, where a
court recently certified a class action that may spell trouble for the
company.4
Citing the $500 million that Purdue Pharma spent to promote
OxyContin, plaintiffs claim that the company's marketing efforts
* J.D. expected 2005, University of Kentucky; B.A. Western Kentucky University,
Government and Economics. The author extends special thanks to Professor Richard C.
Ausness for his initial guidance in the selection of this note topic and for his expertise
regarding tort liability in negligent marketing.
1 Charles B. Camp, Millions Sold, Office by Office Strategy Targeted Busy Doctors,
Hit OxyContin Sales-and Abuse-Boomed, Revealing the Risk of a 'Blockbuster'
Narcotic, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Aug. 17, 2003, at Al, available at http://www.
kentucky.com/mld/heraldleader/news/special_packages/prescnpfaionfor_pain/6551807.htm.
21d.
3 Charles B. Camp, 'We Will Not Give In "-Purdue Fights Oxy Suits Tooth-And-
Nail-and Wins, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Aug. 18, 2003, at All, available at
http://222.kentucky.com/mld/heraldleader/news/specialpackages/prescription-fOr-pain/
6557979.htm.
4 Alison Knopf, Class of Ohio OxyContin Users Certified in Suit Against Drug
Makers, 9 DRuGS IN WORKPLACE 2 (2003). ("The decision to certify the class came in the
wake of a series of dismissals of cases against the makers of OxyContin. Currently, the
certification may have a chilling effect on the prescribing of the drugs, as physicians will
not want to be held liable.").
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constitute overpromotion.5 They consider the company's promotional
campaign a cause of the widespread addiction in eastern Kentucky and
other rural areas.6 Purdue Pharma, however, steadfastly denies all
charges of wrongdoing.7 As a result of What commentators call Purdue
Pharma's "no-compromise stance,, 8 courts in various jurisdictions have
dismissed more than thirty-six suits.9 In fact, Purdue Pharma has been so
successful to date that the company boasts it has never lost or even
settled a case. 10
The OxyContin controversy presents unique questions regarding
overpromotion liability as applied to rural prescription drug abuse, and
particularly highlights the impact of intentional or illegal drug abuse.
Consequently, this note outlines and examines theories of overpromotion
liability, specifically applying these theories to rural prescription drug
abuse. Part I provides a general overview of the OxyContin controversy
and highlights the allegations of overpromotion asserted against Purdue
Pharma.1 Part II examines the relationship between the theories of
negligent failure to warn and overpromotion liability. It then applies
these traditional concepts to Purdue Pharma's sales campaign and the
OxyContin debate.1 2 Part III analyzes how traditional overpromotion
theory is inapplicable in the context of illegal drug diversion and argues
that this form of liability must be altered to fit criminal misuse by
utilizing the much broader negligent marketing standard. It then details
the main arguments surrounding negligent marketing jurisprudence and
analyzes these arguments in the context of rural prescription drug
abuse.' 3
See Camp, supra note 1.
6 OxyContin Maker Targeted Doctors in Touting Painkiller, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville), Aug. 18, 2003, available at http://www.courier-joumal.com/localnews/
2003/08/18ky/ met-4--oxy08l8l-6420.html.
7 See Camp, supra note 1. According to Robin Hogen, Purdue's vice president for
public affairs, the "claims of overly aggressive selling are groundless." He claims that
"no one has ever accused the company of criminal activity or collected a dime by suing."
Id.
8 Camp, supra note 3.
9 Some OxyContin Suits Dropped, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Aug. 2, 2003,
available at http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v03/n l165/a09.html.
0 Camp, supra note 3.
"See infra notes 14-30 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 31-82 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 83-170 and accompanying text.
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I. THE OXYCONTIN DEBATE
The correlation between Purdue Pharma's aggressive sales campaign
and the rise of OxyContin addiction has generated allegations that the
company overpromoted its product. 4 The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) has designated OxyContin as a Schedule II narcotic, due to the
drug's highly addictive nature and the likelihood of abuse.15 As a result,
the FDA regulations forbid its direct marketing to the general public, and
the product's warning indicates that doctors should only prescribe the
drug for "moderate to severe pain.'
6
In 2002, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) publicized that
OxyContin use may have contributed to as many as 464 fatal overdoses
in the prior two years.' 7 Additionally, news sources called it the "drug of
choice" for addicts across the rural South and Midwest, where the
medication fuels regional patterns of illegal drug diversion.' In February
2001, for example, Kentucky law enforcement officers arrested 207
OxyContin dealers and users in "Operation OxyFest," the largest drug sweep
in the state's history.' 9
Despite bad press and the dangers of addiction and illegal diversion,
Purdue Pharma runs an energetic marketing campaign. The company's
primary strategy involves a delegation of sales representatives, called
"detail reps," who market OxyContin to doctors in various localities.
20
Because of its established history of painkiller use, the Appalachian
region has been particularly receptive to OxyContin sales represen-
tatives. 21 Federal data confir-ms that the region currently receives the
greatest per capita share of the drug in the nation.22 In 2000, for example, over
9.7 million pills were sold in Kentucky alone.23
14 See Camp, supra note 3.
15 Linda J. Johnson, Potential for Abuse, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Jan. 19,
2003, at A8, available at http/www.kentucky.com/nmld/heraldleader/news/special_packages/
prescrpton for_pain/4982339.htm.It Beth Packman Weinman, Freedom from Pain: Establishing a Constitutional Right
to Pain Relief, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 495,498 (2003).
17 Id. at 499-500. ("IT]he DEA... verified OxyContin as having directly caused or
played a role in as many as 146 death reports," and it suspects that the drug played a role
in up to 464 fatal overdoses.).
' Id. at 499.
'
91d.2 0 Camp, supra note 3.
21 Id. The Appalachian region includes parts of southwestern Virginia, eastern
Kentucky, and West Virginia.22 id.
23 id.
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Purdue Pharma argues that the allegations of overpromotion are
groundless, claiming that the company markets OxyContin like any other'
drug.24 However, the sales strategy employed by the company is
traditionally associated with less regulated drugs, not Schedule 11
narcotics. 25 The FDA warned Purdue Pharma twice that it considered
OxyContin ads downplaying the drug's risks "egregious and alarming."
26
Additionally, the DEA stated that widespread misuse may have resulted,
at least partly, from the company's promotion and distribution methods.27
Government reprimands coincide with stories of sales representatives
allegedly downplaying the risks of OxyContin. News reports, for
example, have focused on the habits of one OxyContin sales
representative, who pushed doctors to more readily prescribe the drug,
despite the doctors' and pharmacists' concerns about addiction. 28 Reports
also reveal that sales representatives disproportionately promoted the
drug to small-scale family practitioners who have less expertise with pain
medication than more specialized pain management doctors.2 9 Plaintiffs
assert such reports as evidence that Purdue Pharma engaged in a scheme
designed to overpromote the drug, increase sales, and, as a result, create
30higher levels of dependency due to overprescription.
II. NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN AND OVERPROMOTION LIABILITY
Overpromotion liability arises when a court finds that a manufacturer
has negligently failed in its duty to warn users of a product's hazards.3'
Many courts apply a strict liability standard to inadequate warning
cases.32 However, some argue that a negligence standard best applies to
overpromotion claims because such cases concern a supplier's conduct
rather than the defects of the product itself.3 3 This section provides a
24 OxyContin Maker Targeted Doctors in Touting Painkiller, supra note 6.
" ld. See also Camp, supra note 1.
26 OxyContin Maker Targeted Doctors in Touting Painkiller, supra note 6.
27 Weinman, supra note 16, at 500.
28 Charles B. Camp, Inside a Painkiller's Sales Pitch: As Abuse Grew, an OxyContin
Rep Found Himself Trying to Calm Doctors" Fears, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Aug.
18, 2003, at Al available at http://www.kentucky.com/mld/heraldleader/6557979.htr.29 Camp, supra note 1.
30 Id.
31 See generally Janet Fairchild, Annotation, Promotional Efforts Directed Toward
Prescribing Physician as Affecting Prescription Drug Manufacturer's Liability for
Product-Caused Injury, 94 A.L.R.3D 1080 (1979).
32 See id. (citing Jones v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 669 F.2d 744 (N.M.
1983); Bikowicz v. Nedco Pharmacy, Inc., 474 N.Y.S.2d 616 (1984)).
33 See SPEISER ET AL., 5 THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 18:105, at 1033-36 (1988).
The commentary suggests there is little practical difference between negligence and strict
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description of negligent-failure-to--warn theory and presents cases that
illustrate this legal standard. The theory is then used to address
manufacturer liability for rural prescription drug abuse.
A. Tenets of Negligent Failure to Warn
Like all negligence actions, failure-to-warn cases include the
standard elements of duty, breach of duty, cause-in-fact, proximate
cause, and damages.34 The Restatement (Second) of Torts establishes a
supplier's duty to warn when the use of a product entails risks a user may
not recognize. Most of the analysis, however, concerns whether the
supplier breached its duty by "failing to exercise reasonable care" in
warning of a product's foreseeable dangers.3 6 The product does not have
to be defectively designed or manufactured. In fact, even if a product is
reasonably produced, a supplier may fail the objective reasonable person
standard if it does not adequately warn of foreseeable harms.37
With regard to prescription drugs such as OxyContin, most courts
apply the learned intermediary rule.3t Under this doctrine, a doctor
liability causes of action in the context of failure-to-warn claims. Thus, strict liability
analysis seemingly entails a similar standard in such cases. See id.
3 See id.
31 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965). The section provides the
following test for establishing negligent failure to warn:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use
is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel
with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for
physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a
person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier (a) knows or has reason to
know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is
supplied, and (b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is
supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and (c) fails to exercise
reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which'
make it likely to be dangerous.
Id.
36 Id. The comments to § 388 report that the persons to whom a product supplier
shall be liable for failure to give a reasonable warning include not only the direct
recipients of the product, "but also all those who are members of a class whom the
supplier should expect to use it or occupy it or share in its use with the consent of such
person, irrespective of whether the supplier has any particular person in mind."Id cmt. a
(emphasis added). This statement suggests that prescription drug suppliers will be liable
to patients for failure to warn, even though they do not purchase drugs directly from the
manufacturer and may not receive the manufacturer's direct warning.
37 Id; see also Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 219-20 (Pa. 1971) (determining
that negligent failure to warn and overpromotion apply in cases where a product is not
unreasonably designed or manufactured).
38 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 33, § 18:100, at 997-99.
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presumably acts as a "learned intermediary" between the manufacturer
and the patient, passing along the manufacturer's warnings when
prescribing the drugs. Thus, a pharmaceutical manufacturer fulfills its
duty of reasonable care by adequately warning the doctor of a drug's
dangers and, in turn, expecting the doctor to correctly prescribe the drug
to patients.3 9 However, if the manufacturer fails to properly warn the doctor, the
40
manufacturer will be directly liable to the patient for any resulting injuries.
Despite criticism of the learned intermediary doctrine by legal
academics, courts generally have followed it.
41
Determining the reasonableness of a manufacturer's warning to
physicians is a fact-specific inquiry that creates diverse results. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts outlines the following general standard for
judging reasonable care: "the act is negligent if the risk is of such
magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or
of the particular manner in which it is done."42 This means that the fact-
finder must assess the magnitude and likelihood of a drug's harm as
compared to the burden of providing the warning. As the magnitude and
possibility of harm increases, the likelihood that one will be deemed
negligent for failure to warn also increases.43
B. Overpromotion Liability
Overpromotion liability is derived from negligent-failure-to-warn
theory because a company's aggressive or misleading promotional
39 Id. When properly informed, the doctor is assumed to be a learned intermediary
by "evaluating the patient's needs, assessing the risk and benefits of available drugs,
prescribing one, and supervising its use" in a manner that avoids injury to the patient. Id.
40 Id.
4' Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to Greater
Tort Liability for Prescription Drug Manufacturers? 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 97, 113-
14 (2002). The author notes the following public policy arguments supporting rejection
of the learned intermediary rule: (1) erosion of the physician patient relationship through
the introduction of internet drug sales and the interference of managed care companies in
the prescribing process and (2) direct advertising of prescription drugs to the public,
which should force pharmaceutical manufacturers to incur the same duties as other
sellers. Professor Ausness also notes the argument that drug companies' aggressive
promotion practices justify abolition of the learned intermediary rule as well as the
imposition of greater overpromotion liability. The policy underlying both legal
movements concerns the desire to force drug manufacturers to more carefully regulate
warnings and promotions. id. at 136-37.
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965).
43 Id.
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activities "erode the effectiveness of otherwise adequate warnings." 44 An
ordinarily adequate and reasonable warning to doctors becomes
inadequate and unreasonable when a company's promotion of a drug
overshadows the initial warning. Consequently, overpromotion makes
the warning unreasonable in light of all communication. Literature that
explains overpromotion liability cites two landmark cases as
illustrations:4 6 Love v. Wolf 47 and Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co.
48
1. Love v. Wolf
Love, the first case to uphold overpromotion liability in the
pharmaceutical context, involved prescriptions of the antibiotic
Chloromycetin. 49 Following administration of the drug by a doctor, the
plaintiff became severely anemic.50 This event coincided with research
indicating that anemia was one of the harmful side effects of the drug5 1
The drug manufacturer had already complied with an FDA directive by
distributing nearly 200,000 letters to physicians, warning of the
potentially fatal side effect.12 Other announcements to the medical
community, such as drug package inserts and advertisements in medical
journals, supplemented the letters. 3 The warnings in these various
announcements advised against "indiscriminate therapy for minor
infections" and informed doctors of the "calculated risk.,
54
The court determined that the physician who negligently prescribed
the drug had both read and understood the published warnings.59 The
warnings, however, were allegedly marginalized and counteracted by
company advertisements that downplayed the drug's side effects.
56
Additionally, the doctor claimed that the company's pharmaceutical
representatives "extolled the virtues of [C]hloromycetin, and minimized
44 28 C.J.S. Drugs and Narcotics § 62 (2004).
45 See id.
46 See Fairchild, supra note 31.
47 Love v. Wolf, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
48 Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975).
49 Love, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
50 Id.
"' See id. at 184-85.
52 Id. at 185.
53 id.
54 id.
" Id. at 191, 193.
161d. at 195.
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its dangers. ' 7 The representatives, detail men, were allegedly instructed
to tell physicians that the drug had been "officially cleared by the FDA
and the National Research Council with no restrictions on the number or
the range of diseases for which Chloromycetin may be administered."5 8
The representatives were not told to alter their sales pitch, and the
company knew that doctors prescribed the drug for less 'serious
conditions.5 9 The court decided that, in light of the FDA directives, such
statements did not represent the "whole truth" as required in a fair and
proper warning.60 It instructed the jury that "[p]roof of [the company's]
sales . . . [is] relevant to show a motive or reason for the alleged
overpromotion of the drug."'', The court also identified the standard used
to judge the company's actions:
[I]f the overpromotion can reasonably be said to have induced the
doctor to disregard the warnings previously given, the warning given is
thereby withdrawn or cancelled and if, furthermore, the jury could have
found that the doctor here actually prescribed the drug to cure an
infection for which the company's advertising or its detail men had actually
recommended its use, then the pharmaceutical company's negligence
remains as an inducing cause coinciding with the negligence of the
doctor to produce the result.
62
In other words, this standard analyzes whether misleading promotional
statements induced the doctor to mistakenly overprescribe the drug. If so,
then such promotion constitutes unreasonable cancellation of a warning's
effectiveness and becomes a cause-in-fact of the resulting harm.
The doctor in Love indicated that he had at least "partly" relied upon
63promotional statements by company representatives. Based on this
evidence, the court held that the company should remand as a defendant





61 Id. at 189.
62 Id. at 196.
63 Id. Although it found some evidence of reliance on promotional statements in this
particular case, the court noted that, in general, evidence concerning physician reliance
on the promotional statements was certainly not conclusive or overwhelming. Some
doctors stated that they received the promotional statements "with a grain of salt." Id. at
195-96.
4 Id. at 197.
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factually analyze the company's sales campaign and potentially impose
liability for the campaign's effects upon the negligent physician.65
2. Salmon v. Parke, Davis and Co.
Salmon involved a child who became "permanently and seriously
disabled" after taking Chloromycetin.6 6  The guardian ad litem
representing the disabled child targeted the manufacturer's promotional
activities. He argued that the promotion downplayed adequate warnings,
lead to overprescription, and increased the risk of death.67
The primary evidence was the company's advertisement calendar, which
contained no warnings and was located on the prescribing doctor's
desk.6 8 Based on this, the court made the following determination:
It is foreseeable that a calendar might remain on a physician's desk as a
constant reminder to prescribe a drug long after the sample and its
warning had been removed. A jury could infer, therefore, that the
absence of a warning on an advertisement for the use of a drug as
potentially dangerous as [C]hloromycetin was a form of overpromotion
which nullified the effect of even a valid warning on the package.
69
Although slight, this evidence led to reversal of the lower court's
summary judgment in favor of the defendant company and submission of
the overpromotion issue to a jury.
3. The Effect of Doctor Negligence
The courts in Love and Salmon analyzed whether physician
negligence could be employed to hold the manufacturer liable. As the
Restatement (Third) of Torts suggests, negligence lies within the "scope
of risk" created by overpromotion, because it is foreseeable that a doctor
may negligently prescribe drugs based upon a manufacturer's aggressive
and misleading sales campaign.71 Therefore, with regard to proximate cause,
6 See id.
66 Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1360-61 (4th Cir. 1975).
671 d. at 1360.
6 ld. at 1363.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1363-64. There was also a dispute concerning the drug warning that the
company issued to doctors. It did not unequivocally confirm the causal link between
Chloromycetin and anemia, and only announced that the drug could cause the disease. Id.
at 1363.
71 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 (2003).
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physician negligence does not supercede or restrict manufacturer liability
for. overpromotion.72 In other words, it is foreseeable that a doctor may
negligently prescribe drugs based upon a manufacturer's aggressive and
misleading sales campaign.
Conversely, a showing that a physician did not act negligently
defeats overpromotion claims. In Tunnell v. Parke, Davis & Co., the
court held that the fulfillment of a physician's duty of care in prescribing
a drug countered all evidence that sales promotion nullified the warnings
73and caused overprescription. This means that prescriptions written by a
doctor who relied upon a company's statements demonstrate that
overpromotion is a cause-in-fact of the resulting harm.
C. Application to Rural Prescription Drug Abuse
Many of the claims and attacks against Purdue Pharma may actually
misrepresent or exaggerate the truth. After all, isolated stories of
wrongdoing do not amount to an overall scheme to downplay the risks of
the drug. However, to the extent that plaintiffs can substantiate such
claims, overpromotion may provide a feasible method of sanction for
OxyContin's potentially harmful consequences.
First, the aforementioned allegations in the OxyContin disputes
replicate the fact patterns of historical cases applying overpromotion
liability. Similar to Love, OxyContin plaintiffs support their
overpromotion claims with evidence of sales representatives'
communications to physicians that downplay the drug's risks, and
medical journal advertisements that counteract warnings.74 If courts
apply a standard similar to Love, the sales campaign may serve as "proof
or motive" regarding overpromotion. Individual juries would have to
determine that physicians responded to these sales efforts by
overprescribing, which serves as proof that sales promotion "cancelled"
the effectiveness of adequate and reasonable warnings. 75 The overall
warning to physicians would then be deemed unreasonable in light of the
foreseeable dangers and the magnitude of harm.76
Second, widespread physician negligence illustrates and supports the
alleged effect of overpromotion. As previously discussed, negligence by
72 See Salmon, 520 F.2d at 1363.
73 See Fairchild, supra note 31 (citing Tunnell v. Parke, Davis & Co., Prod. Liab.
Rep. (CCH) 8039 (Tenn. App. 1977)).74 See supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text.
75 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
76 See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) or TORTS § 388 (1965).
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doctors propels, rather than restricts, such claims.77 Reports indicate that
many doctors, especially those with less expertise, prescribed the drug
for conditions other than "moderate to severe pain" as required by the
warning.78 Many of these negligent prescriptions have led to patterns of
addiction that form the basis of class action suits.
79
Plaintiffs must meet a high threshold of proof in order to prevail in
OxyContin suits. Past attempts demonstrate that it is a daunting task to
establish a link between the sales campaign, the counteraction of a drug's
warning information, physician negligence, and the resulting harm.80 In
Foister v. Purdue Pharma,81 a Kentucky court ruled that "[t]he plaintiffs
failed to produce any evidence showing that the defendant's marketing,
promotional, or distribution practices have ever caused even one tablet of
OxyContin to be inappropriately prescribed or diverted. 82 This clear
statement may foreshadow the demise of other cases due to inadequate
evidence.
III. THE NEGLIGENT MARKET STANDARD AND ILLEGAL DRUG
DIVERSION
Traditional concepts of overpromotion liability best apply to
addiction resulting from illegal drug prescriptions. However, incidents of
intentional abuse of OxyContin often accompany or derive from legal
prescriptions. Consequently, the difficulty of legally addressing
intentional drug diversion and, in turn, why traditional overpromotion
concepts offer weak grounds for plaintiffs in such cases will be explored
in this section. Also, the much broader negligent marketing theory,
which is specifically designed for cases involving illegality or intentional
product misuse, will be examined and applied.
A. Problems Posed by Illegal Drug Abuse
Illegal drug use creates major problems for lawyers handling
overpromotion class action suits. In West Virginia, for example, one
court has already prohibited overpromotion claims by plaintiffs who have
77 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
78 Camp, supra note 1.
79 Camp, supra note 28.
80 Advertising Restriction on Promotion of OxyContin Denied, 2 No. 1
PHARMACEUTICAL & MED. DEVICE L. BULL. 6 (2002).
81 Foister v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 01-268-JBC 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23765
(E.D. Ky. Dec. 27, 2001).
82 See id.
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illegally or intentionally abused the drug.83 The court cited "the established
legal principle that a plaintiff cannot recover when his own unlawful or
immoral act caused the injuries in question.,8 4 Essentially, allowing
illegal drug abusers to recover would amount to a public policy
violation. 8
The West Virginia court's analysis coincides with principles of
proximate cause which consider wrongful and intentional violations of a
86
warning's direct instructions to be supervening events. Unlike mere
negligence, supervening events break the chain of liability linking the
wrongdoer with the manufacturer. Since the overpromotion foreseeably
leads to physician negligence, such actions are within the "scope of
risk." 87 However, it is difficult to argue that promotional activities
counteract drug warnings in an illegal manner. These intentional acts seemingly
occur in spite of reasonable and adequate warnings.
Attorneys pursuing class action lawsuits in various states have
attempted, without success, to exclude illegal drug abusers from their
subject class. For example, a class action suit initiated in Butler County,
Ohio, includes a former nurse's assistant, a long-time preacher, and a
seventy-nine-year-old retired plant worker among its class of
plaintiffs.8 8 Despite attempts at building a class without illicit users,
lawyers soon discovered that the nurse's assistant had an extensive police
record that included illegal drug abuse.89 This example illustrates the
difficult task that plaintiffs' attorneys face in fashioning a clean and
effective lawsuit.
83 OxyContin: W. Va. State Court Enters First Merits Based Dismissal of OxyContin
Suit, 18 No. 5 ANDREWS PHARM. LITIG. REP. 12 (2002).
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Robak v. Abbott Labs., 797 F. Supp. 475 (D. Md. 1992) (determining that
manufacturers are not liable for failure to warn about unindicated uses); see also Dyer v.
Best Pharmacal, 577 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that express violations of
a drug's warning forecloses manufacturer liability).
87 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 (2003). The section sets forth the
following test for proximate cause: "An actor is not liable for harm different from the
harms whose risks made the actor's conduct tortious." 1d; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 442 (1965). This section notes that the following factors, among
others, may transform an intervening act into a superseding act that limits a
manufacturer's liability: the intervening act "operate[s] independently" of the
manufacturer's negligence; the intervening forces results from a third-party act; and
wrongful intervening act of a third-party exhibits a high degree of culpability. Id.
88 Camp, supra note 3.
89 Id.
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B. Explanation of the Negligent Marketing Standard
Some jurisdictions have attempted to developed a broader
overpromotion standard through negligent marketing theory. This
concept offers support by more significant judicial precedent and is used
for deciding cases involving intentional drug diversion. 90 Instead of
examining whether a company's overall promotional scheme renders
warnings unreasonable, the negligent marketing standard looks directly
at the promotional and distributional activities themselves. This theory
states that sellers have a duty to market and distribute products in a
manner that helps prevent product misuse and other inherent risks.91
Courts have addressed negligent marketing liability primarily within
the context of handgun sales.92 Cases dealing with gun sales have created
three categories of negligent marketing: (1) product designs attracting
criminal users; (2) unreasonable advertising and promotion; and (3)
distribution practices targeting "vulnerable or unsuitable buyers. 9 3 The
distributional element of the negligent marketing standard holds
manufacturers liable for retail efforts that facilitate unauthorized sales or
illegal use.94 In regard to the second category concerning advertising and
promotion, a seller may be liable for promotional activities that
foreseeably entice illegal or dangerous consumers. 95 Legal academics
typically use two cases-Hamilton v. Accu-Tek96 and Merrill v.
Navegar, Inc.97-to explain negligent marketing theory.98
90 See generally Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for the Sale of Non-Defective
Products: An Analysis and Critique of the Concept of Negligent Marketing, 53 S.C. L.
REV. 907 (2002). The author notes that negligent marketing is a relatively new and
untested theory of liability. Since its inception, the theory has both received support and
been rejected. In response to considerable judicial uncertainty, appellate courts have
recently overturned several cases that initially elucidated and applied the tenets of
negligent marketing. See id. at 909.
91 See id.92 Id. at 908.
93 1d. at 912-17.
94 See id. at 915.
95 Id. at 914. For purposes of this note, only the distributional and promotional
aspects of negligent marketing will be discussed in the context of rural prescription drug
abuse. The first category, claims based upon product design, entails circumstances where
the features of the product itself render it highly attractive to criminals. Id. at 912-13.
96 Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated by 264 F.3d
21 (2d Cir. 2001).
97 Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), rev'd, 28 P.3d
116 (Cal. 2001).
98 Ausness, supra note 90, at 909.
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"" 1. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek
In Hamilton, a federal district court in New York applied negligent
marketing theory to guns that ended up in the hands of illegal users. The
plaintiffs, acting on behalf of shooting victims, claimed that a handgun
manufacturer promoted and distributed its product in a manner that
furtheried criminal misuse.99 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that 'the
defendant handgun manufacturer supplied a disproportionate amount of
guns to the Southeast, which has less gun regulation than other areas of
the country. 100 They further argued that the manufacturer knew these
guns were often diverted to other regions and sold illegally, as extensive
literature had previously detailed the problem.'01
The court held that, under New York law, a supplier "is negligent
When it breaches its duty of care by engaging in conduct, posing
unreasonable risk of harm to others."' 02 This means manufacturers must
"exercise reasonable care in marketing and distributing their products so
as to guard against risk of its criminal misuse."'' 0 3 Although the court
noted that manufacturers may market and distribute dangerous, though
non-defective, products, they have a legal duty to "reduce the possibility
that these instruments will fall into the hands of those likely to misuse
them."'104
The court then recited the following factors for a jury to consider
when determining a defendant manufacturer's breach of duty: "the
foreseeable likelihood that [conduct] will result in harm, the foreseeable
severity of harm that may ensue and the burden that would be borne by
the [defendant] and others if the [defendant] takes precautions that
eliminate or reduce possibility of harm."' 0 5 To a considerable extent, this
analysis replicates the standard applied in negligent-failure-to-warn
cases.'1 6  However, Hamilton removes product warnings from
consideration and focuses directly upon specific promotional marketing
99 Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
IoD Id. at 830.
101 Id.
'
02 Id. at 827.
'
03 Id. at 824.
104 Id. at 825. When imposing this duty on manufacturers, the court noted several
public policy concerns, including the degree of danger posed by guns, the availability of
such guns in underground markets, and the heightened concern for public safety. See id.
at 827.
'05 Id. at 828.
'o6 See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
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and distribution practices. This approach bases liability upon whether such
marketing efforts reasonably guard against the potential of illegality,
regardless of the warnings issued.
10 7
The Hamilton opinion also specifically addresses the proximate
cause issue.108 As previously discussed, failure-to-warn cases often treat
illegality as a supervening event that breaks the chain of liability;. 9 but
in negligent marketing theory, intentional criminal misuse is not a
supervening event." As the standard rests upon a manufacturer's
obligation to guard against illegal diversion, it logically follows that such
actions fall within the scope of risk and thus cannot break the causal
chain."'
The expert testimony in Hamilton established that most guns used in
crimes were not stolen; rather, the guns originated from federally
licensed sellers."l 2 As a result, the court determined that the manufacturer
could have reduced this risk by prohibiting gun sales to known
unscrupulous dealers and by restricting distribution in areas where
underground markets operated. 13 To this end, evidence proved the gun
industry's awareness of both the underground markets and the
wrongdoing of various retails sources." 4 The court held that the
manufacturer should have foreseen the effects of its marketing practices;
thus, it stood in the best position to effectively deter crime." 5
Consequently, it was reasonable for a jury to find the manufacturer
liable."
6
2. Merrill v. Navegar
In Merrill, a California court applied the negligent marketing
standard to a manufacturer of semiautomatic weapons." 7 An individual
107 Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 828.
'o' See id. at 833-34.
0o9 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
10 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
... Id. at 834.
"'Id. at 825.
13 See id. at 826, 831-832.
"4 Id. at 829-31. The court strongly relied upon a 1994 promotional pamphlet
introduced into evidence which provided a strong inference of industry knowledge about
the illegal handgun market and its associated retail outlets. Id. at 830.
"' Id. at 827.
116 See id.
117 See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), rev'd, 28
P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
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used:the weapons to kill or wound fourteen people.' 18 As in Hamilton,
the plaintiffs argued that the manufacturer marketed the guns in a manner
that,,increased their appeal to criminals and, thus, failed in its duty to
guard against foreseeable illegality.119 In this regard, the court noted that
"an ,actor may assume others will act lawfully and carefully."'120
However, this "assumption does not always correspond to the. facts,"
especially where the law is commonly disobeyed or where a product is
specifically directed toward individuals "with violent propensities." 12'
While Hamilton focused on distribution practices, the Merrill court
specifically addressed the defendant manufacturer's promotional
activities. Plaintiffs noted that the company's advertisements, often
placed in survivialist magazines, emphasized the guns' "paramilitary
nature" and their resistance to fingerprints. 122 Links were established
between this method of advertising and the targeting of criminal users. 123
The court recognized the rule that, without the presence of a "special
relationship," an actor generally, garners no liability for third-party
acts. 124 However, in this case the defendant's promotional practices were
"grounded upon an affirmative act of [the] defendant which created an
undue risk of harm." 125 As a result, the court held that such promotion,
which "'invited or enticed' persons likely to so misuse the weapon to
acquire it," constituted misfeasance that increased the risk of illegality
enough to potentially impose liability upon the company.
1 26
It should be noted that both Hamilton and Merrill were later
overturned, as higher courts refused to accept the negligent marketing
standard. 127 The opinions faltered on whether courts should impose a
duty of care on enterprises for the intentional, illegal acts of third
Id. at 152.
I9 ld. at 162, 166.
120 Id. at 167.
121 id.
122 See id. at 156-57, 188.
123 Id. at 188.
124 Id. at 164-65.
125 Id. at 168 (citing Weirum v. RKO Gen.', Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 41 (Cal. 1975)).
126 Id. at 168-69. The court also discussed Merrill's relationship to Avis Rent A Car
System, Inc. v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. 4th 221 (1993), which held that a defendant
who left an unlocked car unattended had no duty to protect a plaintiff from a thiecf's
negligent driving. Merrill is distinguishable from cases like Avis because the defendant
gun company had substantial reason to foresee the criminal misuse due to its targeted
marketing. Such conduct is more suitable for the imposition of a legal duty. See Merrill,
89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 168-69.
127 Ausness, supra note 90,.at 939.
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parties. 128 Hamilton foreshadowed this result by admitting that the
judiciary feared "crushing liability" for industries that provide societal
benefits. 129 Due to judicial reluctance to accept such an expansive theoi-y
of liability, the future of the negligent marketing standard remains
questionable. However, to the extent that future courts are willing to use
the standard, it may provide the only effective tool for imposing tort liability in
the cofitext of illegal diversion.
C. Parallels Between Guns and Drugs
A comparison of Hamilton and Merrill with the OxyContin
controversy reveals some parallels that might support a plaintiff's use of
negligent marketing theory in the prescription drug context. With regard
to Hamilton, similarities exist between OxyContin and the distribution of
guns. As already discussed, the Appalachian region has been a fertile
ground for painkiller use and associated drug abuse. A disproportionate
amount of OxyContin sales promotion occurred within the region and
arguably increased the risk of diversion. 130 A court could certainly find
that Purdue Pharma fully understood the increased risk inherent in its
marketing strategy and did not act reasonably when it energetically
promoted the drug in a region already plagued by drug abuse.
The Hamilton court also held that the manufacturers should have
prohibited sales to unscrupulous dealers. 131 Similarly, a court could find
that Purdue Pharma unreasonably promoted and distributed the drug to
doctors who were foreseeably connected with drug diversion. If plaintiffs
can establish that the company was careless in its promotion, despite its
awareness of possible product misuse, a court could hold that the
company failed in its duty to guard against such risks.
In accordance with Merrill, a court may specifically look at the
nature of promotion itself, rather than just the targeted regions and
physicians. Merrill analyzed advertisements in magazines that appealed
, 128 See Daniel L. Feldman, Not Quite High Noon for Gunmakers, but it's Coming:
Why Hamilton Still Means Negligence Liability in Their Future, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 293,
293-301 (2001). The author argues that the historical status of guns in American society
stymied efforts by courts to impose higher duties on gun manufacturers. However, as a
policy matter, this tide may be turning in the wake of the Columbine school tragedy and
other events that have illustrated the harmful consequences of gun use. Id. at 301-02. In a
similar manner, one may argue that the mounting concerns about rural prescription drug
abuse facilitates judicial action.
129 Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 819 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated by
264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001).
130 See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
131 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 829-31.
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to illegal gun consumers, the end users in that case. 132 The OxyContin
controversy concerns sales representatives who promoted and sold the
drug directly to doctors who then distributed the product to end users.
133
Notice that, in contrast to guns, OxyContin was not advertised to the end
users who ultimately engaged in intentional abuse. Further, any evidence
of promotional language geared toward criminality by physicians rests
within the one-on-one sales campaign, leaving the manufacturer free of
promotional incrimination. 34 Advertisements are easily identifiable
because hard copies provide proof of unscrupulous promotional methods.
However, pitches by sales representatives are necessarily individualized
and, hence, not easily discoverable. This difference may create an
evidentiary hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome.
D. Challenges to Negligent Marketing Jurisprudence
Given the unstable status of negligent marketing liability, a future
court must determine whether the standard falls within the realm of
acceptable jurisprudence before applying it to a fact situation. As
discussed, the negligent marketing standard offers a new method for
evaluating a company's promotional activities that correlate with illegal
drug diversion. Critics, however, challenge negligent marketing
jurisprudence on at least two grounds: (1) the efficacy of the enabling
135 overltort, and (2) the jury's overly broad discretion and subjectivity. 36 This
section analyzes both arguments in connection with rural prescription
drug abuse.
132 See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), rev'd, 28
P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
133 See supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text.
134 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
135 See generally Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & John G. Culhane, Gun Tort: Defining a
Cause of Action for Victims in Suits Against Gun Manufacturers, 81 N.C. L. REv. 115,
206-07 (2002) (describing enabling tort as a theory under which "the enterprise may bear
the ultimate responsibility for making possible, or enabling, the direct tortfeasor's
actions.").
136 See Ausness, supra note 41, at 138. Professor Ausness states the following:
Another disadvantage from the defendant's point of view is that the liability
standard for negligent marking is essentially meaningless. There is no
objective way to determine when a particular marketing practice is appropriate
and when it can be characterized as negligent . . . . [N]egligent marketing
claims are predominantly factual in nature and, therefore, will ultimately be
determined by lay juries.
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1. The Enabling Tort
A primary source of criticism concerns the efficacy of the enabling
tort. This emerging theory holds a manufacturer liable for actions by a
third-party tortfeasor or criminal wrongdoer.137 Negligent marketing
theory as applied to gun sales rests within this broader area of developing
tort law. As the aforementioned gun cases highlight, marketing
techniques employed by gun companies allegedly increased the risk of
third-party criminality 3 1 Under enabling theory, producers should be liable
for enhancing these foreseeable risks. 1
39
Legal commentators, upholding the enabling tort's efficacy, assert
that large enterprises like gun manufacturers can market their products in
a manner that reduces the risk of illegal diversion. 40 This form of
liability minimizes reliance upon law enforcement and promotes less
expensive deterrence of criminal activity. 141 This fulfills the efficiency
goal of tort liability: to discover the "cheapest cost avoider" and to then
place liability on that party. 42 This analysis also coincides with the
Hamilton court's determination that, due to public policy considerations
regarding the most efficient risk bearer, gun manufacturers have a duty to
prevent criminal conduct.
43
The court's opinion in Merrill also supports this public policy
argument by pointing out that enabling tort liability deters both morally
137 Eggen & Culhane, supra note 135, at 206-07.
138 See supra notes 92-126 and accompanying text.
139 See Eggen & Culhane, supra note 135, at 206-07.
'
40 Id. at 207.
141 As expressed by authors Eggen and Culhane, the manufacturers can more readily
prevent wrongdoing "ab initio," by regulating marketing and distribution practices that
create the primary risk of criminality. Law enforcement activity, however, often occurs
after the fact, through investigation and prosecution. Id.
142 See id (defining "cheapest cost avoider" as "the party upon whom imposition of
liability will lead to the greatest degree of safety and efficiency"); see also Hamilton v.
Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting the efficiency goal of tort
liability), vacated by 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001).
143 Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 827. The court opined that holding manufacturers
liable
is likely to encourage more prudent manufacturing and distribution practices.
This potential deterrent effect is of particular importance, where, as here, the
legitimate market is saturated .... The tort law can properly impose a strong
incentive on manufacturers to reduce the risk of injury by marketing and
distributing their products responsibly.
Id. (citations omitted).
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blameworthy conduct and future harm.' 44 The court argues that. such
liability does not proscribe a product's marketing altogether, or serve to:
barnthe product itself'145 Rather, it forces manufacturers to internalize'
assoiated societal costs. 4 6 Where a defendant's conduct exhibits "little:.
or no isocial utility" in comparison to the aforementioned harms, the
imposition of a duty remains appropriate in order to deter adverse social
consequences. 14 7
The court also rejected the argument that establishing such a duty for
manufacturers invades the legislature's prerogative. 148  Without
completely banning a product with some social value, courts have long
instructed juries to examine the propriety of conduct through the lens of
the "reasonable person standard" to determine whether plaintiffs deserve
protection fi-om the affirmative risks created by others&49 While such jury
determinations require value judgments, juries play a time-tested role in
representing the "general level of community intelligence' and
perception" and gauging the riot-easily-quantifiable social value of
certain activities.'50
144 Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal Rptr. 2d 146, 178 (Cal Ct. App. 1999), rev'd, 28
P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
145 Id.
w Id.
147 Id. at 171. In a footnote to its decision, the court supported this argument with a
recitation from the Restatement: "Where an act is one which a reasonable man would
recognize as involving risk of harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is
negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the
utility of the -act or of the particular manner in which it is done." Id. at 171 n.14 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965)). The court also cited another
Restatement provision, which holds that balancing the utility and risk involves a
determination of "the social value which the law attaches to the interests which are
imperiled." See id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 293 (1965)).
148 Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179.
14 See id. at 179-80. In reference to this argument, the court stated the following:
Our decision that there is a legal duty is not a statement that the [firearm]
should not be manufactured, or made available to the public or should not be
marketed-In such a way as to make it particularly desirable to a criminal class.
It simply reflects the view that there is a question about reasonableness of the
risk created by [the manufacturer's] activities, that public access to the
[firearm] and the manner in which that weapon is marketed are not of such
overriding social importance that they are entitled to absolute protection as a
matter of law, and that it is therefore for a jury to make the ultimate
determination whether [the manufacturer's] conduct was or was not reasonably
prudent in the circumstances.
Id.
The court also relied upon traditional overpromotion cases as grounds for holding
that these decisions properly belong to the judiciary. Id. at 184-85.
S0 Id. at 180.
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Commentators have also noted that, in the past, other large
enterprises have been held liable for third-party acts: commercial alcohol
vendors have been accountable for reckless, injurious actions of patrons,.
and property owners have been penalized for permitting conditions that
enhance the risk of criminal violence against tenants.15' As a whole,
these examples show that enabling tort theory rests on precedent that
may expand into other areas. In fact, the Hamilton court used this
precedent as grounds for expanding enabling tort liability, stating that
such liability is appropriate when the "third party wrongdoer provides the
defendant with ability to minimize the risk."' 
52
Many courts, however, are reluctant to impose a duty upon
manufacturers to prevent criminal acts associated with their products,
including acts that injure innocent bystanders. By overturning both
Hamilton and Merrill,'5 3 higher courts have created barriers for
establishing enabling tort liability against the gun industry.' 54 Such
decisions arguably reflect politically charged policy efforts regarding gun
control, including organizations such as the National Rifle Association
(NRA) that advocate for a constitutional right of gun ownership.155 From
a legal standpoint, Hamilton foreshadowed the rejection of enabling tort
liability in the gun context. The court noted its reluctance to impose
"crushing liability" for criminal acts "that may destroy [the
manufacturer's] ability to deliver socially useful services."'
' 56
'51 See Feldman, supra note 128, at 296-97 (discussing alcohol vendor liability);
Eggen & Culhane, supra note 135, at 207 (discussing landlord-tenant liability).
152 Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 820 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated by
264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001). It should be noted, however, that most of the authority cited
in Hamilton regarding enabling tort liability involved circumstances where a special
protective or economic relationship existed, such as passenger-carrier, tavern owner-
patron, or landlord-tenant. Id.
153 See Ausness, supra note 90, at 953-54. Professor Ausness notes that courts often
consider negligent marketing a matter of nonfeasance, whereby a special relationship
must usually exist in order for a manufacturer to incur a duty of reasonable care. Id.
However, the Merrill court more adequately stated that negligent marketing entails an
affirmative creation of risk that automatically imposes a duty of reasonable care under
tort law. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 168. Nonetheless, courts reluctantly impose a
duty because of the public policy concerns discussed herein.
154 See Ausness supra note 90, at 939.
i's Rachana Bhowmik, Aiming for Accountability: How City Lawsuits Can Help
Reform an Irresponsible Gun Industry, 11 J.L. & POL'Y 67, 91-93 (2002). See also
Feldman, supra note 128, at 299-301.
156 Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 819. The court cited the following two cases in
support of this public policy concern: Waters v. New York City Hous. Auth., 505 N.E.2d
922, 924 (N.Y. 1987) (finding that the prospect of limitless liability militated against
imposing a duty on city housing projects to protect a passerby from third-party criminal
acts) and Einhorn v. Seely, 136 A.2d 122, 127 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that a locksmith
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Prescription drugs and guns are similar with respect to policy issues
regarding enabling tort theory. Both products contain inherent traits -that
attract criminal users, and both are manufactured by large enterprises that
arguably should have foreseen and curtailed the consequences. Further,
just as gun control is enveloped in a divisive policy debate, negligent
marketing theory regarding pharmaceuticals faces considerable political
challenges. Potentially the most fatal issue concerns the propriety of
addressing illicit drug use. Negligent marketing, at least theoretically,
transforms a form of liability that violates public policy (by allowing
drug abusers to benefit from their own wrongdoing) into a form of
liability that upholds public policy (by making manufacturers
accountable for foreseeable abuse associated with their products). As the
court stated in Hamilton, the foundation of negligent marketing theory
rests upon the foreseeability of product misuse. 157 Likewise, in the
prescription drug context, courts may use drug diversion as a gateway to
imposing tort liability.
However, because courts often prohibit recovery for harms
associated with wrongful conduct, the same public policy concerns may
apply to both negligent marketing and traditional overpromotion claims.
A new, more expansive tort theory may not erase firmly held principles
opposing recovery for an "unlawful or immoral act."' 58 It should be
noted that the plaintiffs in Hamilton and Merrill were innocent gun
victims and family members.' 59 Thus, the only chance of recovery in the
prescription drug context may rest with innocent family members of
illicit drug users, and not with the drug users themselves.
As an additional public policy concern, companies faced with
expansive liability may greatly restrict distribution and access and, as a
result, harm legitimate patients who use OxyContin for its intended
purpose. As many commentators argue, the price of protecting
"irresponsible physicians and illegitimate users from their own bad
judgment" is too high.' 60 The American Pain Society reports data
supporting this argument. The report indicates that 50 million people suffer
chronic pain each year, but only one-fourth receives satisfactory
treatment.' 61 This statistic grants credence to the argument that the
installing a defective lock should not be responsible for rape by an intruder, because such
a ruling would enlarge legal obligations "beyond sound public policy").
158See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
I 'ANDREWS PHARM. LITIG. REP., supra note 83.
159 Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 808; see Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d
146, 152 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), rev'd, 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
160 Lars Noah, Challenges in the Federal Regulation of Pain Management
Technologies, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 55,63 (2003).
161 Weinman, supra note 16, at 502-03.
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legitimate benefits of OxyContin should not be destroyed in order to
eliminate inherent dangers-an argument indicating that the social utility
associated with OxyContin greatly outweighs the social detriments.: mInan
attempt to protect the interests of pain sufferers, the DEA has already
issued a statement advising against interference with legitimate
OxyContin use for the sake of battling illegality. 62 Efforts by plaintiffs
to apply negligent marketing theory to rural prescription drug abuse may,
therefore, prove futile as courts contemplate these negative policy
implications.
2. Jury Discretion and Subjectivity
The courts in both Merrill and Hamilton held that, ultimately,
imposition of liability for negligent marketing rests within the province
of the jury. 163 As the Hamilton court expressed, the fact-specific
determinations required by negligent marketing, like other negligence
cases, are ideally suited for a jury. It is improper for judges to impose
standards of conduct and override the community-imposed perceptions
of the reasonable person standard, which a jury provides. 64
Some critics complain, however, that the negligent marketing
standard is too vague for juries, and that it fails to promote an objective
determination of whether a promotional practice is negligent.'65
Therefore, these critics maintain that juries retain complete discretion without
reference to any objective analysis. Additionally, the standard arguably
grants disproportionate power to plaintiffs' attorneys who may prejudice
juries by portraying defendants as unethical wrongdoers.166
In order to overcome these legitimate concerns, juries and courts will
have to develop and use tools that better objectify their decision-making
procedures. Within the context of pharmaceutical overpromotion, and
particularly the OxyContin controversy, courts may employ the
framework of the regulatory drug categories. Under tort law, government
regulation does not usually dictate the standard of care; however, it
provides support for such determinations. 167 Thus, judges and juries
could use regulatory descriptions of a drug when assessing the
162 Noah, supra note 160, at 63.
163 Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 828; Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 180.
"64 Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 828.
165 Ausness, supra note 41, at 138.
166 Id.
167 See, e.g., Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 177 (iterating that gun statutes in California
do not define the scope of a manufacturer's duty under tort law, but rather, they lend
support and guidance for rigorous enforcement by the courts).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
reasonableness of promotional activities. Such a regulatory system could
track the federal classification system already in place.6 8
: ip-The current federal classification reflects both the medicinal benefits
and. the potentially abusive qualities of a drug. In the case of OxyContin,
its :status as a Schedule II narcotic indicates that, while it serves a
medicinal purpose, it is also very addictive and prone to, abuse.
Therefore, a court or a jury could use this information as a reference
point to aid an objective analysis of a manufacturer's promotional
activities.
With this framework, the fact-finder may better determine the type
of promotion appropriate for different types of drugs. In each
circumstance, the traditional reasonable person standard applies.
However, the same types of promotional activities will not be reasonable
when marketing Schedule II narcotics versus less dangerous
pharmaceuticals. When the foreseeability of crime and the magnitude of
harm increase in comparison to the burden imposed, the manufacturer
will be liable for its marketing and distribution practices.
1 69
In reference to OxyContin, one may argue that its status as a
Schedule II narcotic heightens the foreseeability and magnitude of crime
associated with aggressive drug promotion and thus supports imposition
of overpromotion liability. Further, Purdue Pharma might not have acted
reasonably in marketing OxyContin in the same way as less addictive
drugs. 7 ° However, the use of drug categories does not fully correct for
juries' wide discretion and subjectivity. A comparative analysis of
pharmaceutical dangers illustrates that more addictive drugs may
necessitate restricted marketing efforts, but fails to detail the proper
nature of such promotion. This question will ultimately be left within the
discretion of the fact-finder.
168 Federal law categorizes drugs as follows:
Schedule I" Drugs with a high potential of abuse and no accepted medical use, such as
LSD.
Schedule !I. Drugs with a high potential for abuse that exhibit some medicinal benefits.
This category includes cocaine and oxycodone (the active ingredient in OxyContin).
Schedule 1M: Drugs, such as Lorret and Vicodin, with some potential for abuse.
Schedule /V: Drugs with a low potential for abuse. This category includes Darvon,
Xanax and Valium.
Schedule V. Drugs with a low potential for abuse. This category is primarily comprised
of over-the-counter medicines.
Johnson, supra note 15.
169 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965).
170 See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the increasing number of lawsuits filed against Puirdue
Pharma, one can easily visualize the potential impact of overpromotion
liability. The theory, however, remains relatively untested for- drug
addiction intertwined with illegal diversion. Current and future plaintiffs
must surpass high thresholds of proof when persuading the court to adopt
and apply the theory in the prescription drug context.
Federal and state courts in regions confronted with widespread
OxyContin addiction may more readily accept traditional overpromotion
theory; but, as previously discussed, this theory does not account for the
illicit drug abuse that requires the greatest and most urgent societal
response. Since traditional overpmmotion theory inadequately handles such
cases, courts should re-analyze old precedent and determine whether a
broader enabling tort theory warrants acceptance. The application of
enabling tort liability in other contexts proves that it would not be
unreasonable to apply it in cases of rural prescription drug abuse.
On the other hand, skepticism regarding negligent marketing theory,
as evidenced in both the California and New York gun cases ostensibly
foreshadows the same handling of prescription drug cases-especially
cases in the hands of more conservative courts. To the credit of such
courts, an expansive form of liability should not be applied without
careful scrutiny of the potential consequences. Abuse of OxyContin is a
societal detriment, but the benefit of eliminating the drug must be
weighed against other policy concerns. Thus, the debate regarding
whether the law should protect drug abusers and the impact that decision
will have upon legitimate users is both productive and necessary.
Ultimately, judicial acceptance of the negligent marketing standard
may depend upon whether courts will voluntarily undertake a divisive
policy issue or will rather defer to legislatures and regulatory agencies.
Because of the minimal regulatory movement to date, 171 courts have
considerable room to act on the rural prescription drug abuse issue. The
171 See generally Noah, supra note 160. The author explains that regulatory agencies
have been both reluctant and unable to restrict the marketing practices for OxyContin:
The FDA generally does not have the authority to restrict the distribution of
drugs that it approves. Although the DEA clearly enjoys the power to limit the
channels of distribution for controlled substances by virtue of its scheduling
decisions, it does not usually impose more precise restrictions tailored to a
particular drug. Either agency could attempt to persuade a manufacturer to
accept nominally voluntary limitations that they could not mandate directly, but
that did not happen at the time of OxyContin's approval.
Id. at 63.
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high level of subjectivity and the potential for excessive liability,
however, may persuade courts to refrain from testing this form of
liability in the near future.
